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Deeply embedded in the credit union tradition is an ongoing search 
for better ways to understand and serve credit union members. Open 
inquiry, the free fl ow of ideas, and debate are essential parts of the 
true democratic process.
Th e Filene Research Institute is a 501(c)(3)  not- for-profi t research 
organization dedicated to scientifi c and thoughtful analysis about 
issues aff ecting the future of consumer fi nance. Th rough independent 
research and innovation programs, the Institute examines issues vital 
to the future of credit unions.
Ideas grow through thoughtful and scientifi c analysis of  top- priority 
consumer, public policy, and credit union competitive issues. 
Researchers are given considerable latitude in their exploration and 
studies of these  high- priority issues.
Traditionally, the Filene Research Institute focuses on  long- term 
research questions that can take months or years to research and pub-
lish. Occasionally Filene also publishes Research or Innovation briefs. 
Th ese briefs allow Filene to present important,  time- sensitive, notori-
ous, and unbiased topics to the credit union system. Oftentimes 
these briefs present an opportunity to distribute original research or 
innovation fi ndings from Filene researchers or Fellows. We hope the 
“brief ” format meets your need to obtain actionable and objective 
information in a timely manner.
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1Responsible Debt Relief: An Algorithmic 
Assessment of Household Debt 
Capacity and Repayment Capability
Since the early 1990s, the growth of U.S. household debt in general and 
consumer credit card debt in particular has soared to unprecedented 
levels—from an aggregate total of less than $4.0 trillion in 1990 to 
over $13 trillion in 2008.1 During this period, the average American 
household dramatically increased its home mortgage debt, from almost 
$2.5 trillion in 1990 to nearly $10.5 trillion today.2 Similarly, consumer 
“revolving” or 
credit card debt 
quadrupled from 
$239 billion (B) 
to about $950B 
today.3 Moreover, 
the growth of U.S. credit card debt is substantially underreported by the 
offi  cial U.S. Federal Reserve statistics, due to the tremendous volume 
of mortgage refi nancings that were transacted between 2001 and 2005. 
At least $350B in consumer credit card debt was paid off  through 
mortgage refi nancings, home equity loans, and cash proceeds from 
the sale of real estate over this  fi ve- year period.4 Th is is consistent with 
the fi ndings of Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy, who report that 
“equity extraction was used to repay an average of about $50 billion of 
nonmortgage consumer debt between 1991 to 2005, about 3% of the 
outstanding balance of that debt at the beginning of the year.” Signifi -
cantly, it averaged only $25.2B per year prior to 2001 (1991–2000) and 
then $98.9B over the next fi ve years (2001–2005).5
Th is is especially important, since many American families have 
become dependent on the equity in their homes to fi nance their 
1  Data are for the fi rst quarter of 2008. U.S. Department of Commerce, Flow of Funds, “Debt Outstanding by Sector,” December 2007, p. 8. 
For a discussion of consumer debt statistics and measurement issues, see Robert D. Manning, Credit Card Nation: The Consequences of 
America’s Addiction to Credit (New York: Basic Books, 2000), Chapter 1. See also Robert D. Manning, “Consumer Credit in An Age of Affl uence: 
The Impact of Financial Services  De- regulation,” expert testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Ser-
vices hearing on “Giving Consumers Credit: How Is the Credit Card Industry Treating Its Customers?” Subcommittee on Financial Institutions 
and Consumer Credit, Washington, DC, November 2001 (at www.creditcardnation.com/reports.html). Also see “Banking Deregulation and 
the Consumer Lending Revolution: What Happened to Consumer Rights?” American Bankruptcy Law Journal (forthcoming, fall 2008).
2  Data are for the fi rst quarter of 2008. U.S. Department of Commerce, Flow of Funds, “Debt Outstanding by Sector,” December 2007, p. 8.
3  For data on consumer revolving and nonrevolving debt, see U.S. Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Consumer Credit (April 2008), 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/Current/.
4  See Robert D. Manning, “Examining the Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card Industry and Their Impact on 
Consumers,” expert testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Washington, DC, January 2007.
5  Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy, “Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes,” working paper in the Finance and Econom-
ics Discussion Series (FEDS), U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC, 2007, pp. 9–10.
Th is research brief introduces a new idea called Responsible Debt Relief. If 
you are interested in piloting this service, please contact Professor Robert 
Manning for details at rmanning@saunders.rit.edu. 
2household expenses and are now facing rising credit card balances 
with increasing interest rates. Th is is illustrated by historical home 
equity trends in the United States. Between 1960 and the 1982–1983 
recession, home equity remained relatively stable at about 70%. Over 
the next decade, home equity declined sharply to about 60% in 1993 
and has dropped to a historic low of from nearly 57% in 2001 to 
almost 48% in the fi rst quarter of 2008.6 And, with nearly two million 
 variable- rate home mortgages scheduled to “reset” to higher interest 
rates over the next two years and an impending “consumer-led” reces-
sion by summer 2008 that will precipitate the loss of tens of thousands 
of jobs,7  credit- strapped and  debt- burdened households could trigger 
record levels of loan defaults and consumer bankruptcy fi lings over the 
next two to three years as the “double fi nancial bubble” implodes.8
In 2005, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was viewed by the creditor and 
debt collection industries as a  long- awaited statutory tool for curbing 
the discharge of billions of dollars of unsecured consumer debts. Th is 
 creditor- friendly legislation, with mandatory consumer counseling 
provisions to discourage bankruptcy fi lings and tougher  income- based 
“means-testing” provisions to reduce the number of Chapter 7 con-
sumer debt liquidation petitions, was viewed as the “hard rock” that 
would complement the litigatory “hammer” of traditional adversarial 
debt collection policies. Although consumer bankruptcy rates fell 
sharply—from 1.5 million in 2005 to almost 600,000 in 2006 with 
an increase in Chapter 13 fi lings—the inherent problems of the new 
bankruptcy reform statutes have not been able to curb the growth of 
consumer bankruptcy fi lings in the  post- housing boom period.9 In fact, 
in 2007 bankruptcy fi lings jumped 40% to more than 850,000 (with 
Chapter 7 fi lings falling to 61%) and is expected to exceed one million 
in 2008; more than 226,000 consumers fi led bankruptcy during the 
6  Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy, “Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes,” working paper in the Finance and Econom-
ics Discussion Series (FEDS), U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 27. See U.S. Federal Reserve data for housing 
mortgage debt and home equity in the fi rst quarter of 2008. This fi gure is expected to drop even more in 2008, with the notable 
exception that it will be due to declining home values rather than household equity extraction.
7  Robert D. Manning, U.S. Consumer Sentiment and Household Consumption: Assessing the Wealth Effect and the Prospect of a 
 Consumer- Led Recession, fi nal report, submitted to Fidelity International, November 2007.
8  Robert D. Manning, “Banking Deregulation and the Consumer Lending Revolution: What Happened to Consumer Rights?” American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal (forthcoming, fall 2008). The “double fi nancial bubble” refers to the irrational exuberance of the housing 
bubble of 2001–2005, which unrealistically increased lenders’ perception of consumer debt capacity as traditionally measured by 
household income: (1) home mortgage debt and (2) credit card debt. As banks more aggressively marketed consumer credit cards 
in the early and mid-2000s, the underwriting assumption was that consumers’ greater home equity wealth would miraculously 
absorb rising revolving debt. By essentially disconnecting consumer debt capacity from household income, the only way for American 
families to avoid fi nancial insolvency was to sell their homes and either rent or “trade down” to pay off their unprecedentedly high 
consumer debts. For those households that did not recognize that the U.S. Federal Reserve’s  low- interest-rate economic policy had 
essentially suspended the macroeconomic laws of gravity between 2001 and 2005, the bursting of the double fi nancial bubble in 
2006 and 2007 entailed the disastrous reality of enormous mortgage payments and escalating credit card debts.
9  See the special issue of the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, fall 2008.
3fi rst quarter of 2008.10 Furthermore, Chapter 13 bankruptcy is becom-
ing the option of last resort for many homeowners who are fi nding 
the Federal Bankruptcy Court to be a feasible strategy for retaining 
their homes. Th is is especially likely if falling home values render home 
equity loans as unsecured liabilities, and lenders can be encouraged to 
consider mortgage loan modifi cations instead of foreclosure. Signifi -
cantly, federal bankruptcy judges cannot impose a lower interest rate 
or reduce the outstanding balance of secured loans such as residential 
mortgages.  Th is is especially important to households whose home 
mortgages have been “repackaged” and sold into asset-backed, securi-
tized trusts where investors may not be interested in negotiating loan 
modifi cations.
Th e fundamental problem with the 2005 BAPCPA statutes is that 
they do not refl ect the contemporary reality of the much less stringent 
lending and underwriting policies of the consumer fi nancial services 
industry, which are implicitly based on the rising home equity wealth 
of American households. Th at is, current bankruptcy law preserves 
the historic binary of repaying all or none of outstanding consumer 
debts—based on changing societal defi nitions of worthy versus unwor-
thy conditions for debt forgiveness11—without modifying current 
statistical models of consumer debt capacity and repayment capability. 
Th e result is a rapidly increasing bulge of “near-bankrupt”—middle-
class households that are having diffi  culty servicing their unsecured 
debt due to rising fi nance charges on their credit cards (which increases 
minimum payments) and/or adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs).12 At 
present, these heavily indebted families are less likely to report expe-
riencing fi nancial distress due to traditional factors such as job loss, 
medical expenses, and family crises. Indeed, as long as the robust hous-
ing market off ered nearly unrestricted lines of credit in the mid-2000s, 
their fi nancial diffi  culties were obscured by  mortgage refi nancings, 
home equity extraction, and debt consolidation loans.13
Today, the  near- bankrupt, which include  dual- income households, 
are facing a credit crunch that is forcing them to consider various 
debt management,  less- than-full-balance payoff , and bankruptcy 
10  The most recent consumer bankruptcy statistics are available at the U.S. Federal Bankruptcy Court Web site, www.uscourts.gov/
Press_Releases/2008/BankruptcyFilings.cfm. 
11  See for example, Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay L. Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer 
Credit in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay L. Westbrook, The Fragile 
Middle Class: Americans in Debt (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); and Elizabeth Warren and Jay L. Westbrook, The Law of 
Debtors and Creditors (Gaithersburg, NY: Aspen Law & Business Press, 2001).
12  For a discussion of the expansion of household consumer debt capacity as “stretched” by the aggressive marketing of bank credit 
cards in the 1990s, see Lawrence Asubel, “Credit Card Defaults, Profi ts, and Bankruptcy,” American Bankruptcy Law Journal, Spring 
1997, pp. 249–270. The late 1990s was the fi rst time soaring consumer bankruptcy rates were associated with declining rates of 
unemployment.
13  See Robert D. Manning, “Banking Deregulation and the Consumer Lending Revolution: What Happened to Consumer Rights?” Ameri-
can Bankruptcy Law Journal (forthcoming, fall 2008).
4(Chapter 7 or 13) options.14 Th e problem is exacerbated by reset-
ting ARMs, rising loan to value (LTVs) of their mortgages (pre-
cluding new home equity loans), escalating fi nance rates on credit 
cards, the rising cost of living, and a sharply declining housing 
market for those seeking to pay off  their consumer debts following 
the sale of their homes. Signifi cantly, the overwhelming majority 
of these families intend to repay their debts to the best of their 
abilities while struggling with the unexpected changes in the U.S. 
economy and consumer lending practices.15
Over the next two years many households will increase their credit card 
balances in order to service their home mortgages. Others will enroll in 
debt management programs and eventually drop out due to inevitable 
fi nancial exigencies. Some households that do not qualify for an accred-
ited Consumer Credit Counseling Service (CCCS) program will enroll 
in nefarious debt settlement programs, while the rest will simply give 
up by fi ling for consumer bankruptcy in a  last- gasp eff ort to save their 
homes or to seek protection from the stress of debt collection actions. 
Others will default on their loans and seek informal fi nancial relief out-
side a negotiated partial payment or debt liquidation program; many 
cannot even aff ord the requisite fees to fi le for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
Hence, consumer demand is intensifying for a programmatic solution 
to the “all or nothing” debt repayment binary of CCCS programs (full 
payment) and Chapter 7 bankruptcy (full debt discharge).16
Th e recent emergence and growth of heavily indebted  near- bankrupt 
households (with credit card debts commonly in the $40,000–$60,000 
range) underscores the need for a partial payment plan that balances 
14  The conceptualization and discussion of the emergence of the fi nancially overindebted  near- bankrupt or intermediate group (between 
fi nancially insolvent bankruptcy fi lers and fi nancially encumbered households in debt management [CCCS] programs) was presented 
by Robert D. Manning, expert testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, “Examining the 
Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card Industry and Their Impact on Consumers,” Washington, DC, January 
2007; and expert testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing on “Current Legal and 
Regulatory Requirements and Industry Practices for Card Issuers with Respect to Consumer Disclosures and Marketing Efforts,” 
Washington, DC, May 2005, available at www.creditcardnation.com/reports.html.
15  This theme of the worthy versus unworthy debtor highlights the tension between contending paradigms of individual responsibil-
ity and institutional irresponsibility. For instance, Juliet Schor, The Overspent America: Why We Want What We Don’t Need (New York: 
Harper, 1999) focuses on competitive and referential discretionary consumption, while Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi, 
The Two Income Trap (New York: Basic Books, 2003) emphasize the rise of economic inequality and the soaring cost of living for 
 middle- class Americans. Clearly, the increase in social inequality that began in the early-1990s is highly correlated with rising levels 
of household consumer debt, as discussed in Robert D. Manning, Credit Card Nation: The Consequences of America’s Addiction to 
Credit (New York: Basic Books, 2000) and “Banking Deregulation and the Consumer Lending Revolution: What Happened to Consumer 
Rights?” American Bankruptcy Law Journal (forthcoming, fall 2008). As a result, the debate often devolves into contested views of 
deterministic (increasing social inequality) versus free will (unrepentant consumption) economic behavioralism.
16  Debt settlement programs have temporarily responded to the household demand for  less- than-full-balance payment programs. 
The problem is that most debt settlement companies fall outside of various state consumer protection statutes and have become a 
frequent target of regulatory “cease and desist” actions. Also, they have been plagued by rogue companies that have absconded with 
client funds and/or have failed to protect their clients from debt collection litigation. And, especially germane to this paper, the partial 
payment debt “settlement” proposals are not based on objective estimates of consumer repayment capability and thus have little 
credibility from the perspective of lenders/debt collectors. Signifi cantly, the new BAPCPA statutes offer Chapter 13 fi lers the option of 
a negotiated 5-year repayment of 60% of outstanding unsecured debts (60-60 plan). However, it requires a negotiated plan with each 
creditor and is not based on an empirically objective assessment of consumer debt repayment ability.
the interests of creditors and consumers without incurring costly debt 
collection litigation or bankruptcy fi ling fees. More specifi cally, a 
 means- tested program is needed for  near- bankrupt consumers who 
do not have suffi  cient resources to enter a CCCS debt management 
program (repayment of approxi-
mately 120%–140% over fi ve 
years) but possess enough cash 
fl ow to repay a portion of their 
unsecured debts, even though 
they could fi le for consumer 
bankruptcy. Th e challenge and 
complexity of formulating a fair and equitable  less- than-full-balance 
payment agreement are due to:
Th e large number of diff erent creditors that are owed by indi-• 
vidual households.
Falling and uncertain value of residential property.• 
Sharply rising interest rates on residential mortgages and delin-• 
quent credit cards.
An escalating proportion of household income required for hous-• 
ing and transportation expenses.
Th e lack of an objective, empirical algorithm that precisely esti-• 
mates the repayment capability of consumers and that explicitly 
recognizes diff erences in cost of living, household structure, and 
 after- tax income (itemized or  non- itemized tax fi ling).
Clearly, both creditors and consumers would benefi t from a negoti-
ated repayment program that off ered  near- bankrupt households the 
option of repaying between 20% and 60% of their unsecured debts 
over three years.
The Responsible Debt Relief 
Algorithm: An Objective Grading 
System for Identifying Appropriate 
Debt Management Programs
Th e key to a successful Responsible Debt Relief (RDR) system is the 
objective and statistically precise estimate of consumer debt capacity 
and debt repayment capability.17 Unlike traditional debt collection 
grading assessments, the Responsible Choice program is based on a 
statistically complex and geographically robust empirical algorithm.18 
5
Today, the  near- bankrupt, which include  dual- income 
households, are facing a credit crunch that is forcing them 
to consider various debt management,  less- than-full-balance 
payoff , and bankruptcy (Chapter 7 or 13) options.
17  Hope Financial USA is the exclusive licensee of the RDR algorithm, which is the cornerstone of the growing RDR network of CCCS 
programs, Hope Responsible Choice plan affi liates, and consumer attorneys (Debtor’s Attorney Network).
18  The RDR algorithm is developed by Dr. Robert D. Manning, director of the Center for Consumer Financial Services, E. Philip Saunders 
College of Business, Rochester Institute of Technology. The business  decision- making software is licensed to Hope Financial USA 
(www.hopefi nancialusa.com).
Th is arithmetic estimate of household debt capacity and repay-
ment capability generates two crucially important evaluative assess-
ments: (1) classifi cation of individual consumers into  appropriate 
 means- tested debt management/relief programs, and (2) specifi c 
statistical estimates of consumers’ debt capacity and ability to repay 
outstanding unsecured debt.
In essence, the fi rst component of the RDR assessment distinguishes 
“worthy” from “unworthy” debtors by identifying those households 
that qualify for a debt relief concession from lenders. Th e RDR algo-
rithm classifi es consumers into three distinct grades, or categories, of 
debt repayment capability:
Low• —Chapter 7 bankruptcy is the most realistic option (the 
debtor can repay only a small fraction of their unsecured debts).
Medium• —Th e debtor’s estimated  after- tax income qualifi es for 
substantial debt concession (the debtor can repay 20%–60% of 
unsecured debt over three years).
High• —Th e debtor can achieve full balance payment through 
accredited CCCS debt management programs (fi ve-year plans).
Hence, the RDR consumer debt capacity assessment algorithm serves 
as a grading fi lter for creditors to identify: (a) consumers who cannot 
repay a signifi cant proportion of their unsecured debts and should 
fi le for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, in comparison to (b) consumers who 
merit debt concessions through a  less- than-full-balance payment plan 
and (c) consumers who can repay their unsecured debts in full.
Th e second evaluation phase of the RDR algorithmic assessment is 
a statistically precise,  means- tested validation of an individual’s need 
for a specifi c debt concession in order to avoid fi ling for personal 
bankruptcy. Although the RDR algorithm estimates—in percent-
age terms—the capability of all applicants to repay their unsecured 
debts, only those consumers eligible to fi le for consumer bankruptcy 
are considered for the Respon-
sible Choice program. Th at is, 
the most fi nancially distressed 
consumers who cannot repay 
a minimum of 20% of their 
unsecured debts do not qualify 
for the Responsible Choice 
program and are referred to consumer bankruptcy professionals. 
Similarly, consumers who are able to repay more than 60% of their 
unsecured debts over three years are referred to INCHARGE—a 
nationally respected and accredited CCCS program. Only those 
consumers who can repay between 20% and 60% of their unsecured 
debts over three years qualify for a consumer debt relief concession of 
6
In sum, the RDR algorithm improves the effi  ciency of the 
overall system of consumer debt management programs by 
guiding consumers to the plans that best match their fi nan-
cial situations.
the Responsible Choice program following the confi rmation of their 
fi nancial information.
In sum, the RDR algorithm improves the effi  ciency of the overall 
system of consumer debt management programs by guiding consum-
ers to the plans that best match their fi nancial situations (bankruptcy, 
Responsible Choice, or CCCS) while off ering creditors the assurance 
that borrowers will repay their outstanding debts to the best of their 
ability. Furthermore, the Responsible Choice program complements 
rather than competes with CCCS debt management programs by 
only accepting clients who cannot satisfy the fi nancial requirements 
of a  full- balance payment plan. Similarly, the Responsible Choice 
program does not accept consumers whose fi nancial situations would 
be best served by discharging their unsecured debts through the 
Federal Bankruptcy Court. Instead, the objective of the Responsible 
Choice program is to foster cooperative relationships with accredited 
CCCS companies and the Federal Bankruptcy Court so that consum-
ers confronting unexpected fi nancial diffi  culties—such as rising ARM 
The key empirical components of the RDR 
algorithm are:
Uses total household income rather • 
than individual earnings, which provides 
a more precise estimate of household 
debt capacity and ability to repay out-
standing consumer loans and unse-
cured debts.
Specifi es homeowner status and thus • 
estimates the net cost of home owner-
ship after tax deductions for fi nance 
charges and property taxes. Also, 
the algorithm adjusts for anticipated 
increases in mortgage interest rates for 
adjustable rate loans.
Estimates  after- tax monthly income • 
according to household structure 
(number of dependents) and tax fi ler 
status (itemized or  non- itemized). This 
includes state and local taxes.
Specifi es  locality- based  cost- of-living • 
expenses (household budget) as man-
dated by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
in the district where the consumer 
resides. The wide range in allowable 
household budget expenses, which 
is explicitly incorporated into the RDR 
algorithm, underlies the different debt 
repayment rates both within and across 
states—even among households 
with the same incomes and number 
of dependents. See Figure 6 in the 
appendix for comparison by household 
income, size, and state of residence.
The RDR algorithmic scores are statistically 
precise for the purpose of estimating—
in percentage terms—the net return to 
creditors over the  three- year repayment 
period. Consumers who qualify for the 
Responsible Choice program are required 
to repay the amount specifi ed by the RDR 
algorithm in order to successfully complete 
the program.
CORE COMPONENTS OF THE RDR SCORING SYSTEM
7
8rates—can avoid bankruptcy and honor their debt obligations to the 
best of their ability. Ultimately, Hope Financial will develop strong 
working relationships with regional and national CCCS compa-
nies such as INCHARGE, as well as local bankruptcy professionals 
through the Debtor’s Attorney Network (DAN), so consumers unable 
to qualify for a  full- payment debt management program will be 
referred to the Responsible Choice program rather than bankruptcy. 
Hope Financial refers consumers who do not qualify for the Respon-
sible Choice program to accredited debt management programs or, 
when appropriate, to bankruptcy professionals. See Figure 1.
As explained in the sidebar, the power of the RDR algorithmic 
assessment of household debt capacity lies in its inclusion of total 
household income, housing costs that distinguish renters from 
homeowners, estimates of “net”  after- tax monthly income for paying 
Mass media
Advertising, interviews,
industry reporting
Corporate
outreach
Conventions, seminars, 
community summits
Financial 
services referrals
Banks, credit unions, consumer 
credit counseling
RDR algorithm
HOPE Financial USA
Program completion
Responsible Choice Plan®
Partial balance
program
Full balance
program
Consumer
Credit
Counseling
Service
Low cost
legal assistance
Creditor 
noncompliance
Consumer
bankruptcy
Responsible Debt Relief grading system
Financial literacy education
Newtonian Finances, Ltd.
Individual RDR debt repayment assessment
36 months
Figure 1: Flow Chart of RDR Program: Consumer Referral, Debt Capacity Classifi cation, and 
Program Participation
9unsecured debts, tax fi ling status (itemized versus  non- itemized), and 
 locality- based  cost- of-living expenses. Hence, the algorithm is an 
effi  cient estimator of consumer debt capacity across all states (e.g., 
it incorporates local tax obligations) and geographic localities (e.g., 
urban versus rural areas), household structures (e.g., single versus 
married with dependents),  locality- based household  cost- of-living 
schedules, employment status (e.g., retired, employed), and types 
of household fi nancial loan obligations (e.g., mortgage, installment, 
 court- imposed, medical, revolving).
The Responsible Choice Plan: A 
Win–Win for Lenders and Financially 
Distressed Borrowers
Th e empirically objective RDR algorithmic assessment of house-
hold debt capacity assures creditors that consumers are rec-
ommended for debt relief concessions only if they qualify for 
consumer bankruptcy and thus can only repay a maximum of 60% 
of unsecured debt. If the RDR 
algorithm estimates that the 
consumer can pay a higher 
net amount to creditors, then 
the application is rejected and 
the consumer is referred to an 
accredited CCCS program. Signifi cantly, the algorithmic estimate 
of the creditors’ concessions is designed to maximize the prob-
ability of completing the  three- year repayment plan. Since the 
Responsible Choice plan does not require any upfront or  set- up 
fees from the client, there is not an economic incentive to qualify 
marginally eligible consumers for less than the full balance payoff . 
Additionally, the most fi nancially distressed consumers, those who 
cannot repay at least 20% of their unsecured debts, are referred to 
bankruptcy professionals. (Visit www.fi lene.org/publications/detail/
responsible-debt-relief for summation of RDR consumer debt 
assessment.)
For creditors, the precision of the RDR classifi catory grading system 
ensures that only the most worthy fi nancially distressed households 
are qualifi ed for consumer debt relief. Th e Responsible Choice plan 
specifi es, moreover, that the costs of administering the program 
are paid by those who are fortunate enough to receive debt conces-
sions. Hence, lenders/creditors do not incur any  collection- related 
expenses, which maximizes the net return on their delinquent 
accounts. Indeed, the administrative costs associated with the 
Responsible Choice plan, which includes a comprehensive fi nancial 
planning/budgeting/counseling support network for all clients, are 
For creditors, the precision of the RDR classifi catory grading 
system ensures that only the most worthy fi nancially dis-
tressed households are qualifi ed for consumer debt relief.
10
the lowest of the existing  less- than-full-balance payoff  programs. Th e 
annual administrative costs of the Responsible Choice plan aver-
age approximately 5% of the total outstanding unsecured debt. For 
clients at the low (20%) and high (60%) ends of the payoff  range, 
depending on the total outstanding unsecured debt, the annual aver-
age is less than 5%; administrative expenses are capped at 33% of the 
creditors’ payoff , which is the norm in the debt collection industry. 
Also, administrative maintenance fees are rebated to clients who suc-
cessfully complete the Responsible Choice program.
Th e RDR algorithm specifi es a creditor repayment “bandwidth” for 
qualifi cation in the Responsible Choice plan that ranges from 20% 
to 60% of households’ unsecured debt. Th e lower repayment “fl oor” 
is based on the probability of completing the  three- year program as 
well as the value of Chapter 13 consumer bankruptcy repayment 
agreements that are sold on the secondary market (at approximately 
18%–21% of face value). Th e upper limit “ceiling” is defi ned by the 
60-60 provision of BAPCPA, which off ers consumers the opportu-
nity to negotiate a 60% repayment plan over 60 months. Unfortu-
nately, if past performance is a reliable indicator of the probability 
of success of this 60-60 program, it will not off er much assistance 
to either consumers or creditors; historically, less than  one- fourth of 
Chapter 13 fi lers successfully complete their reorganization plans. 
A major problem is that these long repayment plans (fi ve to seven 
years) encounter unexpected and insurmountable problems such as 
job loss, medical expenses, auto repairs, childcare costs, childbirth 
related expenses, and family crises such as divorce. Th is explains the 
comparably low success rate of  full- balance payment CCCS pro-
grams that are based on similar fi ve- to  seven- year debt repayment 
schedules.
In sum, the Responsible Choice plan off ers a realistic payment 
option for  bankruptcy- eligible households that do not qualify for 
a debt management program off ered by an accredited CCCS com-
pany. For the  near- bankrupt households with the most fi nancial 
resources, only those that can pay a maximum of 75% of their 
outstanding debt over three years (60% to creditors and 15% for 
administrative costs) are eligible for the Responsible Choice plan. 
Th is is considerably less than the typical 120%–140% payoff  of the 
fi ve- to  seven- year CCCS debt management programs. As a result, 
the Responsible Choice and CCCS programs do not overlap, since 
the RDR assessment algorithm ensures that consumers are classifi ed 
and are referred to the debt repayment plan that is most appropriate 
to their household fi nancial capacity. Hence, Responsible Choice and 
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CCCS programs complement each other and will generate reciprocal 
referrals in the goal of matching consumers with the most appropri-
ate fi nancial management program. Furthermore, in situations where 
resetting mortgage loan payments may force consumers to drop out 
of CCCS debt management programs, they can be recommended 
to the Responsible Choice plan rather than fi ling for consumer 
bankruptcy. Such cooperative relationships will off er more benefi cial 
assistance to consumers as well as increase the net payoff  to lenders/
creditors such as credit unions.
RDR and the  Near- Bankrupt
Th e crucial advantage of an empirically objective RDR consumer 
debt assessment algorithm is its ability to establish a transparent and 
balanced framework for lenders/creditors and borrowers to negotiate 
a realistic debt repayment plan that is based on a statistically precise 
estimate of household fi nancial capacity across the United States. 
Th is creates a win–win for credi-
tors and consumers by increas-
ing the net repayment rate while 
enabling consumers to avoid 
enduring the pitfalls of fi ling for 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, the 
RDR consumer debt assessment algorithm—with its ability to esti-
mate the rising cost of ARMs in the assessment of household fi nan-
cial capacity—will relieve downward pressure on the imploding U.S. 
housing market by enabling consumers to negotiate debt concessions 
that allow them to retain their homes. Th is is especially important 
in the successful development of regional partnerships with non-
profi t organizations that wish to incorporate the Responsible Choice 
program into existing community development and empowerment 
projects. Th e fi rst pilot grass roots RDR project is being conducted 
in Cleveland, Ohio.
By reducing the need for creditor litigation, the RDR consumer debt 
assessment algorithm will enhance net repayment rates to creditors 
since it precisely estimates the maximum amount of consumer debt 
that can be realistically repaid. In the process, the rigorous RDR 
grading algorithm and more realistic  three- year repayment schedule 
of the Responsible Choice program ensure a much higher success 
rate than Chapter 13 reorganization or CCCS debt management 
plans. With strict program qualifying criteria and a shorter repay-
ment schedule, lenders/creditors will benefi t from the RDR  grading 
algorithm and the Hope Financial administrative system by not 
wasting resources on debtors who will eventually fi le for consumer 
Th is creates a win–win for creditors and consumers by 
increasing the net repayment rate while enabling consumers 
to avoid enduring the pitfalls of fi ling for bankruptcy.
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bankruptcy or can only repay a small proportion of their outstanding 
consumer debt. As the ranks of the  near- bankrupt continue to swell 
along with soaring levels of unsecured debt, the objective algorithmic 
estimate of consumer debt capacity will become an essential tool in 
recalibrating the balance between profi table consumer lending and 
responsible consumer debt relief.
Appendix 13
Appendix
State Guidelines for 
Household Exemptions 
to Consumer Bankruptcy
In bankruptcy, debtors are allowed to keep certain itemized assets, 
known as “exempt” assets. Exemptions, however, vary from state to 
state. Th e U.S. Congress, in enacting the federal bankruptcy laws, spe-
cifi cally gives states the right to opt in or out of the federal exemptions. 
Some states have opted to retain federal exemptions. Other states have 
opted out, and instead apply their own state exemptions. Th e follow-
ing states allow the use of the federal bankruptcy exemptions: Arkan-
sas, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
As a result, some states end up being more lenient toward credi-
tors, while others tend to be more sympathetic to the debtors. For 
instance, fi ve states allow debtors to keep their homes no matter how 
expensive or extravagant they are, whereas other states force the liqui-
dation of property as an attempt to pay off  the debts. Other varia-
tions include the types of debt that a debtor can discharge, although 
many of these are federally mandated without exception.
According to the Federal Bankruptcy Law, a debtor can keep $475 
per item in any household goods up to a total of $9,850; $1,225 
in jewelry; $3,225 in motor 
vehicle; $1,850 in tools of trade; 
$9,850 in life insurance policy 
with loan value, in accrued divi-
dends or interest; and $18,450 
in personal injury compensation 
payments. A “wild card” provi-
sion allows retaining $925 of any personal property. Th e homestead 
exemption is limited to $20,200; unused portion of homestead up to 
$10,125 may be applied to any property.
If the state has opted out of the bankruptcy exemptions, only the 
exemptions found in state law can be used to protect assets in bank-
ruptcy. Th e exemptions are based on the laws of the state that the 
debtor lived in for the two years prior to fi ling for bankruptcy. How-
ever, if the debtor has recently moved, the home state is considered 
the state in which the debtor lived for the majority of the 180 days 
preceding the last two years.
Th is section highlights bankruptcy rules for states with high 
levels of bankruptcy fi lings. We publish this information 
to illustrate the complexity of bankruptcy rules across the 
United States.
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Under the new federal law, a debtor must have acquired a home 
(or paid for a home with funds from the sale of another home in 
the same state) within 40 months prior to fi ling in order to claim 
that state’s full homestead exemption. If a debtor does not meet this 
 residency requirement, the allowed homestead exemption is capped 
at $125,000, even if the exemption for that state is higher.
Some debts cannot be discharged. For example, one cannot discharge 
debts for:
Most delinquent taxes.• 
Child support.• 
Alimony.• 
Most student loans.• 
Court fi nes and criminal restitution.• 
Personal injury caused by driving drunk or under the infl uence of • 
drugs.
Means Testing
In order to determine the debtor’s eligibility for Chapter 7 or Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy, the means test is used by the courts. Th e debtor 
must enter income and expense information on the appropriate 
bankruptcy means test form and then make calculations using the 
entered information.
Median Family Income
Th e means test compares the debtor’s average income for the past 
six months, annualized, to the median income for households of the 
same size in the debtor’s state of residence. Median income informa-
tion used for comparison purposes is available on the U.S. Census 
Bureau Web site (www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/ statemedfaminc.
html) and the U.S. Trustee Program Web site (www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/ 
bapcpa/20070201/bci_data/median_income_table.htm).
Figure 2 provides median family income data reproduced in a format 
designed for ease of use in completing bankruptcy forms. For cases 
fi led on or after April 1, 2007, add $6,900 for each individual in 
excess of four.
If the debtor’s income is less than or equal to the state median 
income, the debtor “passes” the means test and may fi le Chapter 7. 
If the debtor’s income exceeds the state median income, a further 
analysis is performed, looking at the debtor’s calculated ability to 
fund a Chapter 13 plan. Th e debtor’s disposable income is calculated, 
applying a mix of actual and standardized expenses to the debtor’s 
previous average income.
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Some of the information needed to complete these calculations, such 
as a debtor’s current monthly income, comes from the debtor’s own 
personal records. However, other information needed to complete 
the forms comes from the Census Bureau and the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS).
National Standards for Allowable 
Living Expenses
Th e IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses are 
available from the IRS Web site (www.irs.gov/businesses/small/
article/0,,id=104627,00.html) and the U.S. Trustee Program Web 
site (www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/bci_data/national_
expense_standards.htm). Th e allowable living expenses include fi ve 
categories of necessary expenses: food, housekeeping supplies, apparel 
and services, personal care products and services, and miscellaneous. 
Allowances for food, clothing, and other items apply nationwide 
except in Alaska and Hawaii, which have their own tables. Taxpayers 
are allowed the total National Standards amount for their family size 
and income level, without questioning amounts actually spent. If a 
debtor is paying a mortgage or is paying a loan for a car or leasing it, 
the expense that is for the actual debt is separated from the allow-
able expense, because the debt itself is not an actual necessary living 
expense.
Figure 2: Median Family Income by Family Size
State One earner
Family size
Two people Three people Four people*
California $44,499 $59,086 $64,118 $72,996
New York $42,896 $51,994 $62,815 $74,501
Utah $42,244 $49,107 $54,948 $59,872
Texas $34,418 $48,849 $51,678 $59,369
Florida $37,985 $46,914 $52,648 $64,280
* Four or more household members.
Source: www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/bci_data/median_income_table.htm.
Figure 3: National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses
Family size
Gross income
Less than 
$833
$833–
$1,249
$1,250–
$1,666
$1,667–
$2,499
$2,500–
$3,333
$3,334–
$4,166
$4,167–
$5,833
$5,834 and 
over
One person $367 $409 $461 $498 $556 $621 $703 $916
Two persons $578 $595 $627 $744 $825 $825 $904 $1,306
Three persons $802 $808 $812 $819 $924 $926 $1,017 $1,368
Four or more 
persons
$856 $890 $936 $941 $1,042 $1,063 $1,203 $1,546
Source: www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/bci_data/national_expense_standards.htm.
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Figure 3 shows the total of the fi ve necessary expenses according to 
the debtor’s family size and income level. A qualifying debtor can 
claim additional food and clothing expense (“apparel and ser-
vices”) if the debtor’s average monthly food and clothing expense 
exceeds the combined allowances for those two subcategories, not 
to exceed 5%.
Local Standards
Th e local standards for estimating  locality- based standard of liv-
ing are published by the IRS and consist of two primary expense 
categories: (1) transportation and (2) housing and utilities. Th e 
fi rst factor used in the bankruptcy means test is transportation 
expenses. Th is information is available on the IRS Web site (www.
irs.gov/ businesses/small/article/0,,id=104623,00.html). It consists 
of nationwide fi gures for monthly loan or lease payments referred 
to as ownership costs, and additional amounts for monthly operat-
ing costs broken down by census region and metropolitan statisti-
cal area (MSA). Th e ownership cost allowable is the same for all 
MSAs—$471 for the fi rst car and $332 for the second car. Th e 
operating cost and the cost of public transportation vary by state. 
To calculate the total allowable living expense for transportation, the 
nationwide fi gures for monthly ownership costs and monthly operat-
ing costs for a specifi ed region are needed. Figure 4 reports the total 
allowable living expenses for transportation.
Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses
Information about local standards for housing and utilities can 
be found on the IRS Web site (www.irs.gov/businesses/small/
article/0,,id=104696,00.html) and the U.S. Trustee Program Web 
site (www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/meanstesting.htm). 
Th e housing and utilities standards are published by the IRS by 
state, county, and family size. For the purposes of the bankruptcy 
forms, the housing and utilities standards are provided in two 
components—nonmortgage expenses and mortgage/rent expenses. 
Figure 4: Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation for 
Selected Regions
Region No car One car Two cars
Los Angeles $284 $897 $1,311
New York $313 $873 $1,287
Denver $312 $809 $1,223
Houston $287 $809 $1,223
Tampa $264 $724 $1,139
Source: www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/meanstesting.htm.
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Figure 5 shows the total housing and utilities expenses for specifi ed 
states and counties.
Bankruptcy Exemptions by State
New York
New York debtors may only choose from the state bankruptcy 
exemptions. New York provides a small homestead exemption, does 
not give annuities any meaningful protection, and makes it hard to 
protect life insurance.
Th e New York homestead exemption is limited to $25,000 for a 
single person. A couple may claim the homestead exemption limit of 
$50,000.
Th e list of exempt property in New York and the extent to which it 
is exempt is found in the New York State Debtor and Creditor Law. 
Th e debtor can protect $2,500 in household goods and all stoves, 
food, and necessary fuel for 60 days; one sewing machine; the family 
Bible, family pictures, and school books; other books not exceeding 
$50 in value; church pew; certain domestic animals not to exceed 
$450; clothing; household furniture; one refrigerator; one radio 
receiver; one television set; crockery, tableware, and cooking utensils; 
a wedding ring; and a watch not exceeding $35 in value.
In addition, all the necessary tools, furniture, and equipment for a 
trade or business not exceeding $600 in value are exempt.
Th e debtor can keep one motor vehicle not exceeding $2,400 
($4,800 for couples) and can protect $2,500 in cash, but not if 
claiming a homestead exemption.
New York State bankruptcy law has no specifi c earnings exemp-
tion. An annuity is exempt to the extent determined by the court 
that it is needed for the reasonable requirements of the debtor and 
the debtor’s dependents. Th e cash surrender value of a life insurance 
policy is protected from the policy owner’s creditors.
Figure 5: Total Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses
State/County
Family size
 One or two 
persons Three persons
Four or more 
persons
California/Orange County $1,819 $2,141 $2,462
New York/Queens County $1,689 $1,987 $2,285
Utah/Salt Lake County $1,237 $1,456 $1,674
Texas/Harris County $1,122 $1,320 $1,518
Florida/Hillsborough County $1,096 $1,289 $1,483
Source: www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/meanstesting.htm.
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Texas
Texas residents may choose from either the state or federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions. Texas is a  debtor- friendly state, having expansive 
and unlimited exemptions for homestead, life insurance policies and 
their cash value, and annuities. Additionally, Article 16, Section 28 
of the Texas state constitution bans the garnishment of wages, except 
for child or spousal support.
Th e homestead exemption value is unlimited. Th e exemption is lim-
ited to 10 acres in a city or town or 100 acres (200 acres for families) 
elsewhere; sale proceeds are exempt for six months after the sale. 
However, the new bankruptcy legislation caps the unlimited home-
stead exemption at $125,000 if the homestead property is acquired 
within 1,215 days of fi ling the bankruptcy petition.
Th e debtor in Texas may also exempt personal property up to 
$30,000 in value. Exempt personal property includes family heir-
looms; sporting equipment; two fi rearms; one automobile per driver 
in the family; two horses, mules, or donkeys; 12 head of cattle; 60 
head of other livestock; 120 fowl; pets; offi  ce furnishing and supplies 
used in a trade or profession; and wearing apparel.
All vehicles with two, three, or four wheels, including automobiles, 
trucks, trailers, and tractors, are exempt for each qualifi ed family 
member. Th e debtor can also keep all farming or ranching vehicles, 
tools, equipment (including boat and motor vehicle equipment), and 
books used in a trade or profession.
Utah
Utah debtors may only choose from the state bankruptcy exemp-
tions. Utah’s statutory creditor exemptions have very little protection 
for real estate, and only moderate protection for properly structured 
life insurance arrangements.
Real property or a mobile home used as residence or water rights up 
to $10,000 may be claimed as a state exemption. If the property is 
jointly owned, then each debtor can claim the exemption, but the 
total joint exemption cannot exceed $20,000.
Th e following personal property is exempt according to the Utah 
bankruptcy law: burial plot; all health aids; washer and dryer; refrig-
erator, freezer, stove, and microwave oven; one sewing machine; all 
carpeting; provisions suffi  cient for 12 months; all clothing; all beds 
and bedding; and $3,500 in implements, books, and tools of trade. 
An individual is entitled to an exemption of the following property 
up to a total value of $2,000 ($4,000 per couple): sofas, chairs, din-
ing and kitchen tables, and related furnishings reasonably necessary 
for one household; animals; books; heirlooms; and other items of 
particular sentimental value to the individual.
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Life insurance proceeds are exempt, if the benefi ciary is the insured’s 
spouse or dependent.
Each individual is entitled to an exemption for one motor vehicle 
not exceeding $2,500 in value. If fi ling jointly and the spouses share 
one vehicle, each spouse can assert the vehicle exemption against 
the same vehicle. If the equity in the vehicle shared is not more than 
$5,000, it is protected from bankruptcy. Th e vehicle exemption is 
applicable to motorcycles if the motorcycle is the debtor’s primary 
means of transportation.
Florida
Th e state of Florida has opted out of all federal laws on exemptions. 
Florida debtors may only choose the state bankruptcy exemptions.
Florida bankruptcy law heavily favors debtors. According to Florida 
bankruptcy proceedings, you can keep more of your personal property 
during a bankruptcy than in any other state. Florida’s state constitution 
provides unlimited protection to homesteaded property for persons 
who have established residency there. Th e homestead exemption is 
limited to a  half- acre tract within a city and 160 contiguous acres 
elsewhere.
For this reason, a Florida resident who has a $100,000 home with 
no mortgage may fi le Chapter 7, discharge debts, and emerge from 
bankruptcy with full ownership of this $100,000 home, free of any 
claims of creditors. However, a New York resident in the same situ-
ation would lose the house, since New York law limits a homestead 
exemption to $50,000.
However, the new Bankruptcy Act limits the homestead exemp-
tion to $125,000 for homestead interests that are acquired within a 
1,215-day period (three years and four months) prior to the fi ling of 
the bankruptcy petition.
Th e state of Florida provides near total protection for the cash value 
of life insurance policies and annuities. Th e debtor can exempt any 
personal property up to $1,000 (a husband and wife may double 
this) and a motor vehicle up to $1,000.
California
California has opted out of the use of the federal bankruptcy exemp-
tions and provides its citizens the choice of the state exemptions. 
California has two bankruptcy exemption systems. Th e debtor must 
choose one set of exemptions; one cannot pick one exemption from 
one system and another from the other system. If spouses fi le a joint 
case, they must select an exemption system jointly; they can’t each 
select a separate system. Spouses do not get to double the exemptions.
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California Statutory Creditor Exemptions: System 1
Compared to System 2, System 1 includes a generous exemption 
for equity in the debtor’s residence. Th e homestead exemption limit 
is $50,000 in California for a single person; $75,000 for a couple; 
$150,000 for those who are 65 or older or physically or mentally dis-
abled; and $100,000 for those who are 55 or older and who are single 
and earn less than $15,000, or are married and earn less than $20,000.
insurance-based household income
Disability or health benefi ts.• 
Fraternal unemployment bonds.• 
A life insurance proceeds or avails if clause prohibits proceeds • 
from being used to pay benefi ciary’s creditors.
Fidelity bonds.• 
Homeowners’ insurance proceeds for six months after received, to • 
a maximum of the homestead exemption amount.
Matured life insurance benefi ts needed for support.• 
Unmatured life insurance policy loan value up to $10,775 for a • 
single person and $21,550 for a couple.
According to System 1 the debtor can keep an unlimited number of 
ordinary and necessary household goods; $6,750 in jewelry; $2,550 
motor vehicle; $6,750 in tools of trade per debtor, $13,475 if used 
by both spouses in the same occupation; unlimited retirement ben-
efi ts; and 75% of wages paid within 30 days of fi ling for bankruptcy.
California Statutory Creditor Exemptions: System 2
Th e homestead exemption limit for real or personal property, includ-
ing  co- ops used as a residence, is $20,725. Th e unused portion of the 
homestead may be applied to any property.
insurance-based household income
Disability or health benefi ts.• 
Life insurance proceeds or avails needed for support.• 
Unmatured life insurance contract accrued avails to $11,075.• 
Unmatured life insurance policy other than credit.• 
According to System 2 the debtor can keep an unlimited number 
of household and personal items worth $525 or less each; a burial 
plot up to $20,725 in lieu of homestead; $1,350 in jewelry; $3,300 
motor vehicle; $2,075 in tools of trade; $20,775 in personal injury 
compensation payments; $1,100 of any property; and retirement 
benefi ts necessary for support.
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Singles/Urban Low Median High
Gross income $28,000 $63,000 $87,000
Gross monthly 
income $2,333 $5,250 $7,250
Monthly household 
budget $498 $703 $916
Monthly 
expenses
Compared 
to Florida’s 
expenses
Expenses 
above 
Florida’s
Monthly 
expenses
Compared 
to Florida’s 
expenses
Expenses 
above 
Florida’s
Monthly 
expenses
Compared 
to Florida’s 
expenses
Expenses 
above 
Florida’s
California
One car $897 124% $173 $897  36% $173 $897  33% $173
Mortgage/Rent $1,819 166% $723 $1,819  72% $723 $1,819  66% $723
Total living expenses $3,214 139% $896 $3,419 136% $896 $3,632 133% $896
Estimated state 
income taxes
$82 — $82 $334 — $334 $739 — $739
Grand total $3,296 142% $978 $3,753 149% $1,230 $4,371 160% $1,635
New York
One car $873 121% $149 $873  35% $149 $873  32% $149
Mortgage/Rent $1,689 154% $593 $1,689  67% $593 $1,689  62% $593
Total living expenses $3,060 132% $742 $3,265 129% $742 $3,478 127% $742
Estimated state 
income taxes
$127 — $127 $327 — $327 $464 — $464
Grand total $3,187 137% $869 $3,592 142% $1,069 $3,942 144% $1,206
Utah
One car $861 119% $137 $861  34% $137 $861  31% $137
Mortgage/Rent $1,237 113% $141 $1,237  49% $141 $1,237  45% $141
Total living expenses $2,596 112% $278 $2,801 111% $278 $3,014 110% $278
Estimated state 
income taxes
$70 — $70 $225 — $225 $362 — $362
Grand total $2,666 115% $348 $3,026 120% $503 $3,376 123% $640
Texas
One car $809 112% $85 $809  32% $85 $809  30% $85
Mortgage/Rent $1,122 102% $26 $1,122  44% $26 $1,122  41% $26
Total living expenses $2,429 105% $111 $2,634 104% $111 $2,847 104% $111
Estimated state 
income taxes
— — — — — — — — —
Grand total $2,429 105% $111 $2,634 104% $111 $2,847 104% $111
Florida
One car $724 100% — $724 100% — $724 100% —
Mortgage/Rent $1,096 100% — $1,096 100% — $1,096 100% —
Total living expenses $2,318 100% — $2,523 100% — $2,736 100% —
Estimated state 
income taxes
— — — — — — — — —
Grand total $2,318 100% — $2,523 100% — $2,736 100% —
Figure 6: Comparison of Allowable Household Monthly Budget Expenses by Income, State of Residence, 
and Size of Household
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Families/Urban Low (2+2) Median (2+2) High (2+2)
Gross income $48,000 $91,000 $136,000
Gross monthly 
income $4,000 $7,583 $11,333
Monthly household 
budget $1,063 $1,546 $1,546
Monthly 
expenses
Compared 
to Florida’s 
expenses
Expenses 
above 
Florida’s
Monthly 
expenses
Compared
to Florida’s 
expenses
Expenses 
above 
Florida’s
Monthly 
expenses
Compared
to Florida’s 
expenses
Expenses 
above 
Florida’s
California
2 Cars $1,311 181% $587 $1,311  52% $587 $1,311  48% $587
Mortgage/Rent $1,888 172% $792 $1,888  75% $792 $1,888  69% $792
Total living expenses $4,262 184% $1,944 $4,745 188% $2,222 $4,745 173% $2,009
Estimated state 
income taxes
$217 — $217 $551 — $551 $899 — $899
Grand total $4,479 139% $1,256 $5,296 143% $1,590 $5,644 152% $1,938
New York
2 Cars $1,287 178% $563 $1,287  51% $563 $1,287  47% $563
Mortgage/Rent $1,653 151% $557 $1,653  66% $557 $1,653  60% $557
Total living expenses $4,003 173% $1,685 $4,486 178% $1,963 $4,486 164% $1,750
Estimated state 
income taxes
$241 — $241 $486 — $486 $759 — $759
Grand total $4,244 132% $1,021 $4,972 134% $1,266 $5,245 142% $1,539
Utah
2 Cars $1,276 176% $552 $1,276  51% $552 $1,276  47% $552
Mortgage/Rent $1,285 117% $189 $1,285  51% $189 $1,285  47% $189
Total living expenses $3,624 156% $1,306 $4,107 163% $1,584 $4,107 150% $1,371
Estimated state 
income taxes
$112 — $112 $278 — $278 $503 — $503
Grand total $3,736 116% $513 $4,385 118% $679 $4,610 124% $904
Texas
2 Cars $1,223 169% $499 $1,223  48% $499 $1,223  45% $499
Mortgage/Rent $1,012 92% –$84 $1,012  40% –$84 $1,012  37% –$84
Total living expenses $3,298 142% $980 $3,781 150% $1,258 $3,781 138% $1,045
Estimated state 
income taxes
— — — — — — — — —
Grand total $3,298 102% $75 $3,781 102% $75 $3,781 102% $75
Florida
2 Cars $1,139 100% — $1,139 100% — $1,139 100% —
Mortgage/Rent $1,021 100% — $1,021 100% — $1,021 100% —
Total living expenses $3,223 100% — $3,706 100% — $3,706 100% —
Estimated state 
income taxes
— — — — — — — — —
Grand total $3,223 100% — $3,706 100% — $3,706 100% —
Figure 6: Comparison of Allowable Household Monthly Budget Expenses by Income, State of Residence, 
and Size of Household (continued)
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